Iran-Iraq War Essay

The Iran-Iraq fight is considered as hotshot of the keen-sighteditudinal and most violent battles in history. This eight- year long build up contravene was truly the pull up stakes of numerous events. The opposition mingled with Iran and Iraq can be traced from the one-seventh hundred. It was a rivalry grounded on the antagonism among Persians and Arabs, just as it was based on the involution betwixt Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. These ethnic and spectral divisions were further intensified by territorial disputes, which would continue until the twentieth Century. In addition, politics played a role in initiating the fight itself.The rivalry existed many years ago, but the fight was aggravated by the mixtures in g everywherenance in twain countries. The Iran-Iraq War was a violent beset between the aforementioned provinces from September 1980 until August 1988. The employment was save stop with the intervention of the United Nations. The battle proved to be a long and tedious one, as the tension between the countries extended for years. There were excessively countless casualties as a result of the disastrous occurrence. When the warfare ended, incomplete nation could truly be declared the victor.both Iran and Iraq did non deliver the goods in gaining new territories or semi semi presidencyal advantages. It is of import to comment that Iraq was the nation responsible for starting the war. However, the aggression of ibn Talal Hussein Hussein was not the of import cause of the wars occurrence. In fact, in that respect is no mavin cause to be blamed for the war. The origins of the Iran-Iraq War are deeply grow in ethnic, religious and territorial battles which date back from the seventh century it was exacerbated in the modern era repayable to ambitions of dominance.This term paper aims to talk about the understandings behind the Iran-Iraq War on twain accounts the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab river and the political t ension caused by the Islamic Revolution and the rise of Baath regime. The Iran-Iraq War occurred because of various drives. The encroach between the two nations involved was characterized by separate conflicts. The tension that had long persisted between Iran and Iraq were caused by differences in religious beliefs and political positions, as thoroughly as dis parallelisms on the draw ups (Iran Chamber Society ICS, 2009).The worry between the countries was fueled by the businesss between the following opposing dispelies Sunnis and Shia Muslims, Arabs and Persians, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch, 1997). Moreover, some(prenominal)(prenominal) Iran and Iraq sought to gain supremacy in the constituent (Br suffer, 2008). The Iranian-Iraq War which started in September 1980 was a testament to the extended conflict regarding the boundaries of their territories and their share in the Shatt al-Arab river (Hunseler, 1984). The war was alike a result of the fight of some(prenominal) parties to become the most dominant and influential in the country.However, it is weighty to point out that there is a significant difference between the 1980 war and the conflicts prior to it. The proterozoic conflicts between Iran and Iraq were settled with the interference of European countries which only meddled to safeguard their respective engrosss. As for the 1980 war, both sides fought to preserve their own interests. No external power intervened with that war. Two main reasons why the conflict became prolonged are the mutual disputes over territory (especially the Shatt al-Arab) and the involvement of both sides in the domestic troubles of the other (Hunseler, 1984).The Beginning of the Persian-Arab Conflict The origins of the conflict between Iran and Iraq started many centuries before both nations were testifyed. It is important for one to be familiar with the history of the conflict why the 1980 war began in the maiden p lace. gibe to Hunseler (1984), the Iran-Iraq tension had its roots in the seventh century with the Arab-Persian conflict. It was this centuries old shift which ignited the battle over the Shatt al-Arab. Persia stood out from the others because patronage being under(a) the control of the Arabs, it retained its content identity (Hunseler, 1984).In AD 636, the Sassanids of Persia at sea to the armies of Arab General Sad bin Abi Waqqas at the Battle of Qadisiya. Meanwhile, the Persian conglomerate became dissolved in AD 642 due to the Battle of Nihawand. composition they held on to their presents culture and territorial honor, the Persian population embraced Islam in the aftermath of the collapse of the Persian pudding stone. The Arabs and the people they conquered viewed Islam and Arabism as a union. However, notwithstanding being under the enamour of Islam, the culture of Persia cannot be restrained (Hunseler, 1984).An important thing to consider in understanding the histor y of Persia and its political and brotherly existence is what Hunseler (1984) called the juxtaposition of Persia and Islam (p. 8). The principle was said to have been derived from the notion of the state based on Zoroastrianism. harmonize to the Zoroastrian notion of a state, it must(prenominal) have the following a secularly-legitimized kingship, the survival of the Persian language and the towering awareness of a distinct Persian history (Hunseler, 1984, p. 8). After two centuries, the Sunni-Arab Abbasid caliphate had become interested in the Persian literature (Hunseler, 1984).In time, the Persian families which belonged to the caliphate of the Abbasids began to assume control by grabbing power repeatedly. From AD 954 until 1055, the Buyid dynasty possessed adequacy ascendance to manipulate politics in the western portion of Persia and Iraq. In addition, they withal had the power to strictly limit the function of the caliphs of Abbasid to religious belief only. This was t he reason why the legacy left by the Buyids in Iraq was considered as the conflict between Persianism and Arabism (Hunseler, 1984). In the 17th century, the Safavids in Persia declared Shiism as the state religion (Hunseler, 1984).The Safavids exerted influence on Persia for 15 long years they stayed in the state from 1623 to 1638 (Hiro, 1991). The declaration was seen as Persias attempt to establish its boundaries and separate itself from Arab nations while keeping the matters under the influence of Islam. Shiism became a crucial part of Islamic history, as it was the first to present a rift in the unified world of Islam. This was because Shiism open uped itself in a separate state. The kings of the Safavids considered themselves as mainly secular leaders they charge the religious functions to the theologians.In turn, the Shia ministers did not want to give up their posts which were as sign-language(a) to them under the Safavid rule. Most especially during the time of the Qajar l eaders, the clergy were given money and land. The apportion of such gifts allowed them to be financially independent from the king it excessively gave them the hazard to exert political influence. Meanwhile, no such similar fare had occurred in the Sunni Arab states (Hunseler, 1984). The Sunni-Shia Problem The existing Persian-Arab conflict had taken a conglomerate turn with the addition of yet another conflict the Sunni-Shia problem (Hunseler, 1984).The problem was not exactly about tension between the differing branches of Islam. Instead, there was antagonism due to the amount of influence that a particular religion has on the maturement of political power in the state. The conflict continues at present day, as there are tranquillise areas wherein the Arab communities consist of both Sunni and Shia factions (Hunseler, 1984). Those who head the Shia clergy in Arab countries such as Iraq and Bahrain nominate difficulty in assuming certain social positions (Hunseler, 1984).In Persia, the Shia clergy had no problems exerting influence in society because Shiism was revered with national significance. In addition, Shia leaders faced with two outputs regarding loyalty. commencement, they encouraged the pass around of Shiism in states whose population were not exclusively Shia. Therefore, they became involved in the centuries-old conflict between the Shia and Sunni. Second, they were victims of the suspicions of Arab rulers who thought they were submitting to the influence of non-Arabs (Persians).They were often seen by their Arab counterparts as promoting non-Arab causes. This situation caused the Arab Shias to be constantly detached from their political leaders. The separation was also caused by doubt on secular leading, as well as Shia millennialism (Hunseler, 1984). The Persian-Arab conflict and the attempts of both sides to become to a greater extent dominant and influential than the other in the bosom East became apparent(a) in areas where the Su nni and Shia groups, and the Arabs and Persians, fought against each other (Hunseler, 1984).Even though the Persians and Arabs in the Arabian peninsula had the Persian-Arab Gulf to set them apart in terms of geography, the conflict eventually made itself apparent on the boundaries on land. This was the primary reason why the conflict persisted for many years both sides incessantly well-tried to acquire the territories of the other and the quest for a mutual adjoin dragged on (Hunseler, 1984). The Origin of the Conflict over the Shatt al-Arab The conflict between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab river originated in the 17th century and began as the rift between the pouf pudding stone and Persia (Hunseler, 1984).The sultan of Turkey, Murad IV, captured capital of Iraq in 1638 and the initial shutdown regarding the boundaries with Persia was drafted a year later. The Kurds and the Armenians occupied the north while the Arabs dominated the south. The landmark fell on areas whe rein the tribes did not consider either the Persians or Turks as their masters. As a result, the border resolving power was drafted with consideration to the tribes and the names of the places. The agreement also took in consideration the intention of both parties to unite the tribes of Istanbul or Esfahan.The Kurdish-Armenian demarcation caused many conflicts after it was set up, but order was al authoritys restored in reference to the 1639 courage. Unfortunately, the 1639 agreement proved lacking in setting the boundaries in the Shatt al-Arab vicinity. On one hand, Persians believed the river itself was a natural border. On the other hand, the Turks upheld the claim that the river belonged to the Ottoman Empire. According to the Turkish point of view, the Arab tribes which occupy both sides of the river are considered a wiz entity from Arabistan. Arabistan is part of the Ottoman Empire.Hence, the Shatt al-Arab was to be considered as under the possession of the Ottoman Empir e (Hunseler, 1984). In the 19th Century, terminal point problems continued. In 1823, a boundary problem surrounding the Muhammarah surfaced and Persians settled in the city (Hunseler, 1984). Both Russia and cracking Britain extended their assistant on the matter. On May 15, 1843, a boundary tutelageing was formed and poised in Erzerum, a city in Turkey. The perpetration consisted of exercises from Turkey, Persia, Russia and Britain. A conformity was created on May 31, 1847, and contained three major guidelines.First, Muhammarah and its harbor, as well as Khidhr Island, were awarded to Persia. Meanwhile, Turkey was granted admission to Zuhab and Sulaymaniyah. Second, the perpetration was designated in situ to delineate the specific course of the boundary (Hunseler, 1984, p. 11). Lastly, the Ottoman Empire was given the entire Shatt al-Arab extending to the marker on the east, except for the territories mentioned above (Hunseler, 1984). The treaty of 1847 was rather ambiguou s, and its inherent vagueness proved to be its biggest flaw (Hunseler, 1984).The treaty did not phone the question of which nation had the responsibility over the eastern shore. While the Shatt al-Arab was placed under Turkish jurisdiction, the specifications of the border were not indicated. Turkey treasured to resolve the extend over the treatys vague statements regarding Arabistan/ Khuzistan. As a result, Russia and broad Britain included an explanatory note to assert that the problem raised by Turkey was not compromised by the treatys lack of clarity (Hunseler, 1984, p. 11). Turkey declined to approve the treaty until Persia grantd the note as part of the treaty (Hunseler, 1984).Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan acknowledged the note and signed the treaty as a delegate of the Persia. After the Persian political sympathies discovered the inclusion of the added note, it nullified the treaty and failed to approve it. They argued that the Persian representative had no power to sign th e document (Hunseler, 1984). To allot the issue, the boundary committee inspected the Turkish-Persian border from 1850 until 1852 (Hunseler, 1984). Unfortunately, the commission was not able to do its job correctly because of the opposing claims of Turkish and Persian commissioners.Persia maintained that they were given the entire slam found east of the Shatt al-Arab, while Turkey opposed the claim. The committee was unavailing to provide a definite proposition to solve the problem. While the committee continued its efforts in the northern area of the Shatt al-Arab, the design of the boundaries of the rivers region was postponed indefinitely (Hunseler, 1984). Persia was relentless in its efforts to claim territories and continued to bring up its border issues in the succeeding years. Persia sought Russia and Britain to mediate on the border problem (Hunseler, 1984).Persia wanted to share control of the Shatt al-Arab with Turkey the state also wanted to discuss the rights with r egards to the harbor. Unfortunately, Britain and Russia were not in agreeable terms since the mid-19th Century. Hence, both nations were not prepared to mediate in behalf of the Shatt al-Arab tension. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian convening had an agreement. This agreement divided Persia into three separate zones. In the northern part of Persia, Russia maintained a sphere of influence. In the southern area, Britain had its own sphere.Meanwhile, the warmheartedness area was considered as neutral ground. It was not until after this division was established that the Anglo-Russian concern for the Turkish-Persian border was revived (Hunseler, 1984). Russia became once again involved with Persian-Turkish personal matters because it was specifically interested with the province of Azerbaijan in Persia (Hunseler, 1984). The interest was the result of strategical and economic factors in relation to Turkey. On the contrary, Britain was different from Russia because its interests w ere not curb to Persia alone.Britain was also focused on the Turkish territory of the Shatt al-Arab because it played a crucial part in British interests in the Gulf area. In July 1911, an Anglo-Turkish mediation in attempt to come up with a small town that would jell the territorial claims and rights in the Arab-Persian Gulf region began. On July 29, 1913, the resolution was signed by Turkey and Britain. The agreement included the decisions regarding the status of Arab sheikdoms. The resolution also included the agreements about the Shatt al-Arab and its significance to the increasing British authority in Arabistan and Iraq.The resolution proved to be beneficial for Turkey, but only because Britain acted on it for its own advantage. Meanwhile, Russia was outraged by the Anglo-Turkish agreement and initially renounced it. Britain caught Russia by surprise by awarding the Shatt al-Arab in its entirety to Turkey. Russia had its own interests to cling to in Shatt al-Arab and the Gu lf area, and the agreement served as a hindrance to the Russian cause. However, Britain gave Russia the guarantee that it would offer assistance in the latters interest in the northern section of the Turkish-Persian border.After Britain gave its guarantee, Russia acknowledged the Anglo-Turkish agreement (Hunseler, 1984). On celestial latitude 21, 1911, Persian Foreign Minister and Turkish representatives from capital of Iran gathered in Istanbul to create a boundary commission to resolve the Turkish-Persian border problem (Hunseler, 1984). The commission began to meet in March 1912 by August, the commission had convened a total of 18 times. In the beginning, the efforts of the commission seemed futile due to Persias disapproval of a specific note explicative of April 26, 1847 (Hunseler, 1984, p. 13).However, Russia exerted influence and Tehran was forced to agree on the note on August 15, 1912. The early progress of the Turkish-Persian commission was accompanied by statements alread y found in the Four-Power Protocol of Constantinople dated on November 17, 1913. With regards to the area of the Shatt al-Arab, the definition of the border was placed in conformity with the Second Treaty of Erzerum of 1847. According to the treaty, the Shatt al-Arab is considered as a Turkish territory excluding the limitations concerning Abadan and Muhammarah. By November 1913, two-thirds of the border assignment was completed.The t invite of settling the complete boundary was given to a Four-Power Delimitation Commission. This commission had to define the border based on what was 1869s carte identique (Hunseler, 1984, p. 13). The commission started running(a) in 1914. Unfortunately, the First World War broke out. The subject of the war hindered Persia and Turkey from acknowledging the border (Hunseler, 1984). The Aftermath of World War I The Iranian-Iraq deviation on the Shatt al-Arab The conflict and rivalry between Iran and Iraq officially started after the First World War (Hunseler, 1984).The outcome of the war significantly altered the issue over the borders concerning the Shatt al-Arab. Hunseler (1984) explained The British mandate of Iraq, which had come about in Mesopotamia, entered into the Turkish boundary claims against Iran, although it also impinged upon British navigational privileges on the Shatt al-Arab (p. 14). The aftermath of the Great War also allowed Iran to experience a outstanding political transformation. In 1921, Muhammad Reza Khan came into power. Under his reign, Iran became resistant to the established agreements regarding the Shatt al-Arab (Hunseler, 1984).It was also in 1921 when Khazal, the dude of Muhammarah, lost. Khazal was a known sustentationer of the British cause. With his defeat, Iran was granted the prospect to fervently defend its own interests on the Shatt al-Arab conflict. Due to the new found empowerment of Iran, Britain was suddenly placed in a position wherein it should machine its rules without putting its Iranian interests in jeopardy (Hunseler, 1984). Meanwhile, Iraq asserted its control over the Shatt al-Arab (Hunseler, 1984). Due to the claim, Iran declined to recognize the state of Iraq.In 1929, Iran did give diplomatic realisation to Iraq, but only because it sought to gain the attention of Britain. Iran hoped that by acknowledging Iraq as a state, Britain would be sympathetic towards the Iranian cause. Britain was still interested in Iran because of economic reasons the precedent is involved with the latter finished the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Moreover, Britain was still interested with the Shatt al-Arab issue. This was because it could provide the British complete access to the refineries located in Abadan. On August 11, 1929, the Iranian and Iraki governments had interchanged several notes.This exchange gave way to the establishment of a temporary arrangement to manage the relations between the two states involved. The arrangement included settlements on trade and navigation. However, the negotiations failed because Iraq and Britain refused to recognize the jurisdiction of Iran on the half of the river (Hunseler, 1984). When Britain decided to remove its authority on Iraq and hand away from their alliance in 1930, it imposed the right of the British navy blue to pass with the Shatt al-Arab anytime, regardless if it was wartime or peacetime (Hunseler, 1984).However, Iran had no intention in being involved in a peaceful settlement. The Iranian government also declined to accept the legitimacy of the border. On March 25, 1924, Iran announced its non-acceptance of determination of the boundary as stated in the Constantinople Protocol. The Iranian government also refused to recognize similar settlements created on September 20 and December 2 in 1931. The situation worsened when Iran sent four gunboats to pass by Shatt al-Arab and proceed until Muhammarah.Due to this incident, problems regarding the pilot and the flags of the ships were added to the already intense conflict (Hunseler, 1984). The boundary issue as well as the flag and pilot inquiries which hang ined unanswered increased the tension surrounding the conflict (Hunseler, 1984). On November 29, 1934, the Iranian government was forced to seek assistance from the League of Nations in an effort to address the problem. Unfortunately, the League of Nations and the representatives it sent failed to bring any positive change in the current situation.The only thing which provided temporary resolution to the problem was the Middle East pledge of 1935, which Iran had introduced with the help of Turkey. The pact presented an opportunity wherein all points of variableness could be settled. On July 4, 1937, a treaty on the Iranian-Iraqi border was agree upon in Tehran. The treaty upheld the conditions indicated in the 1913/14 Protocols of Constantinople. According to the treaty, the Iran-Iraq border would remain along the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab. There were spe cific considerations made for Abadan and Muhammarah. Iran was also awarded an anchorage zone in Abadan which was four miles long.In addition, the treaty rendered the river as open territory, as it allowed access to naval ships of Iran and Iraq and traders of all countries. A theodolite fee was imposed, but this would be utilized for purposes of maintenance as well as the development of the shipping lanes in the river. In another decision, both sides agreed to accept the protocol within two years after the agreement had been reached (Hunseler, 1984). The adoption of the covenant was not implemented (Hunseler, 1984). On December 8, 1938, the commission in charge of the Iranian-Iraqi boundary started working on the meeting of the Shatt al-Arab and the Khayeen.The efforts of the commission were stalled by opposing translations of the treaty and the definite determination of the border. The Iranian government submitted suggestions regarding the balance of power between Iran and Iraq wi th regards to supervising and safeguarding the Shatt al-Arab shipping lanes. Meanwhile, the Iraqi administration saw this move as a brat to the reign of the Iraqis on the river (Hunseler, 1984). In the 1950s, Iran and Iraq had another opportunity to resolve their issues regarding the Shatt al-Arab border (Hunseler, 1984).In 1955, both countries, along with Britain, Pakistan and Turkey agreed upon the Baghdad Pact (Karsh, 2002). This pact was initiated by the West and was established to strengthen defense and security in the region. In October 1957, King Faisal of Iraq paid a state visit to Iran (Hunseler, 1984). In this encounter, both nations reached an agreement regarding the Shatt al-Arab problem. Iran and Iraq agreed on two points. First, there give be a commission to be based in Baghdad which is assigned to work out the details of the enounce supervision of the Shatt al-Arab.Second, a Swedish adjudicator will be in charge of delineating the border this umpire is to be hard ened in Tehran and must work with the joint commission. Once again, an agreement between Iran and Iraq was hindered by yet another occurrence. On July 14, 1958, a revolution broke out in Baghdad (Hunseler, 1984). The change in Iraqi governance eventually disrupted the recently resumed development of Iranian-Iraqi ties (Hunseler, 1984). Also, the political change once again awakened the border conflict on the Shatt al-Arab and the land borders.Four short months after General Abd al-Karim took control, the basal administration of Iraq declared that they would extend their claim on the river to 12 miles. On November 28, 1959, Iranian Shah Reza Pahlevi revived their request to have the border line of the river raddled along the middle. He justified his demand on grounds of Iraqs clear violation of the 1937 treaty. He also argued that because they were already in the 20th Century, a river which served as a boundary such as Shatt alArab cannot be attached to the absolute sovereignty of either nation.General Qasim intercommunicate the demand of the shah with another demand. Iraq sought to regain the anchorage zone awarded to Iran in the 1937 treaty. Despite their counter demand, Qasim still wanted to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. Iraq was willing to withdraw their claim of the anchorage zone if Iran would acknowledge the Iraqs demands on the river and the treaty of 1937. The peaceful settlement was not reached. On December 10, 1959, Abbas Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram declined Iraqs offer.Nine old age later, General Qasim reasserted Iraqs legal right to the anchorage zone without insisting on its return. He also appealed for Iran to value the early treaties. General Qasim suggested that they could address the problem with the help of the United Nations. However, Iran provoked Iraq again when the local newsprint Ettelaat stated that the existence of Iraq was in any event a diachronic misunderstanding and the whole of Iraq a Persian province ( as cited in Hunseler, 1984, p. 17). An armed struggle between Iran and Iraq was quelled before the further tension could develop.On March 5, 1959, Iran became involved with the United States in a defense settlement (Hunseler, 1984). Soon after, Iran felt coerced by Russia. Iran had reasons to be concerned. It was threatened by Soviet influence and the possible circulation of further revolutionary ideals. Meanwhile, Iraq was also concerned with the threat of the United Arab Republic, a state established in 1958 as a result of the merger between Syria and Egypt. Abd al-Karim Qasim was frightened that Syria might provide assistance to Iraqi Nasserites if and when a war with Iran occurs.Hence, there was no real war between both parties at that time. The tension manifested itself through a media war between Iran and Iraq (Hunseler, 1984). In 1967, Britain declared its wishes to pull out from the Gulf area. blooming Minister Harold Wilson expressed the desire of the British administratio n to remove its armed forces troops located east of Suez (as cited in Hunseler, 1984, p. 17). With this announcement, Iran wanted to replace British forces with their own troops on the moment of the latters departure (Hunseler, 1984).The 1967 blockage of the Suez Canal was a welcome development, as it prevented Soviet activity in the Gulf region. In terms of security concerns, Iran wanted to flux and lead the Arab countries in the region. The supposed partnership had the goal of preventing the spread of Soviet control and power of revolutionary nations and factions, such as South Yemen and Iraq. The Arab countries in the Gulf were cautious in dealing with Iran. While they were hesitant to join with Iran which was associated with Israel, they did not want to create a rift among the states (Hunseler, 1984).Iran continued to powerfully pursue its ambition of becoming an unshakeable force in the Gulf region (Hunseler, 1984). In 1969, it condemned the 1937 treaty. The shah knew that if Iran wanted to govern and manipulate the shipping lanes in the Gulf, it must have exclusive control of the river. This move would also liberate the Iranian ports on Abadan and Khorramshahr from Iraqi jurisdiction. On one instance, an Iranian vessel sailed despite the absence of an Iraqi pilot. It departed from the Khorramshahr port with the assistance of Iranian police vessels and successfully arrived at the Persian-Arab Gulf.Iraq was aware of the violation, but it did not wage a war against Iran due to the weakness of the military (Hunseler, 1984). After 1972, the shah became more resolute to cripple Iraq. After the completion of the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty, the Shah approached American President Richard Nixon to ask for assistance in the Kurdish cause in Iraq (Hunseler, 1984). This action was do with the objective of weakening the Iraqi army through an attack on its internal disputes. In August 1972, another uprising emerged in Kurdistan.The Iraqi administration and Kurdish chief Mullah Mustafa Barzani met in March 1970 and agreed on the autonomy of Kurdistan beginning in 1974. However, the agreement was threatened by the support of Iran and the United States for Barzani. Because of this, the Kurdish insurgents continued to hold on to their weapons and proceed with the courtly war. Meanwhile, the Iraqi forces benefited from the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty, for it allowed for a steady supply of ammunition from Russia. The weapons were instrumental in guaranteeing the military success of Iraq.Nevertheless, the malfunctioning of the armys weapons and the trial of the Soviet Union to provide more ammunition endangered the progress Iraq had in its fight against the Kurds. In the early part of March 1975, the Iraqi government was prompted to consider Irans proposition that it would refrain from supporting the Kurds if the former would approve the latters suggestion to resolve the border issue by placing the border line along the thalweg (Hunsel er, 1984). On June 13, 1975, Iran and Iraq agreed on yet another treaty in Baghdad (Hunseler, 1984).The treaty consisted of four crucial agreements. First, the boundaries will be definitely marked based on the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the 1914 proposal created by the committee regarding the establishment of the boundary. Second, the river boundaries would be situated in the middle, or the thalweg. According to Willet (2004), the thalweg was the central deepest part of the river (p. 7). Third, there are two things to be rebuilt the mutual trust between both nations as well as the security of the land boundaries they shared.Also, the invasion on both sides will be stopped. Lastly, the problem will be settled upon with the acknowledgement of the aforementioned points. When Iraq signed the treaty, the country accepted the thalweg agreement for the first time. After five years, it became evident that the said recognition was merely the result of coercion from Irans side. The a cceptance of Iraq was also caused by the failure of the Soviet Union to provide weapons. Nonetheless, the compromise made regarding the Shatt al-Arab paved the way for the Kurdish civil war to stop.Meanwhile, the relevance of the river in terms of Iranian scheme was relatively reduced. This was because Iran transferred its navy from Khorramshahr to the Bandar Abbas port in August 1978 (Hunseler, 1984). The Iran-Iraq War from a Political Perspective The dispute over the borders and boundaries of the river of Shatt al-Arab was instrumental in the emergence of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. While the territorial conflicts played a crucial role in causing the war, the political conditions in both countries must also be considered as initiators.The transition in the governments helped influence the leaders on how to deal with the Shatt al-Arab issue. In Iran, there was a dramatic shift in leadership as the Shah was removed from power through a revolution led by a radical Muslim. In Iraq, several coups have altered governance while the rise of the Baath Socialist Party to power resulted in the domination of Saddam Hussein. Both countries longed to dominate the other and emerge as the most powerful in the region (Jacoby, 2008). The Iranian-Iraqi situation under the Rule of the ShahIn the 1970s, the tension between Iran and Iraq was heightened (Karsh, 2002). This was because of the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, became aggressive and tried to present Iran as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf. The Shah had been governing the Iran for decades. However, he was temporarily overthrown from power. In 1953, the head of the Iranian Parliament started a coup to remove the Shah (Willett, 2004). The coup succeeded and Pahlavi vacated the Iranian leadership for a brief time. However, the United States