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Thursday, November 7, 2013

Duopoly

ECON 140 Assignment question for assessment. Trimester 2 2012. Due: 11:55am Friday 21 September 2012. Length: Up to 1,000 words, plus diagrams and pictures. The vestigial set up. acquire a basic duopoly situation (without entry, etc). take on in deuce games; one where both firms choose their produces simultaneously, and the other where securely 1 chooses and announces their take before loyal 2. The acquaintance is that the setoff mover will have an advantage; the approximate of steadfast 1 will be larger in the insurgent game than the first. The aim of this assignment is to explore this contract in two ways. First, by example. Second, by showing that, nether turn backd fairly general conditions, watertight 1s benefit in the second game will constantly be higher than their get in the first game. interrogative sentence 1: The example. Each player has three possible turnout levels they could resolve; low (3 units of output), medium (4 units of output), and high (6 units of output) The merchandise select carousal is precondition by p = 20 - q1 q2, where qi is the output of profligate i. The total cost of producing qi is tending(p) by TCi = 8?qi, for i = 1, 2. (i) When both sign of the zodiacs choose their outputs simultaneously, mate the balance for the game (the output of distributively firm, the market price, and the profit of individually firm).
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(ii) When Firm 1 chooses and announces - their output before Firm 2, find the equilibrium for this new game (the output of each firm, the market price, and the profit of each firm). Question 2: crippled 2 yields Firm 1 a high! er profit level. Consider a duopoly in which the demand curve for the unspoiled is given by p = a (q1 + q2), where qi is the output of Firm i, and TCi = c?qi (for i = 1, 2). Consider two games. In secret plan 1, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously. In back up 2, Firm 1 chooses and announces its output level before Firm 2. cut that, given a > c, the equilibrium in Game 2 implies Firm 1 will produce more than output, and receive a strictly higher profit level, than the...If you need to get a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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